In this essay, James M. Buchanan explains the research program of Constitutional Political Economy (CPE) as an inquiry regarding the study of rules, how rules work and how rules might be chosen. Buchanan defines it as follows: "Constitutional Political Economy is a research program that directs inquiry to the working properties of rules, and institutions within which individual interact, and the processes through which these rules and institutions are chosen or come into being". He argues that the central elements of CPE are: (1) methodological individualism; (2) rational choice.
First, Buchanan distinguishes CPE from conventional economics in that orthodox economics is about choice within constraints, whereas constitutional economics focuses on the choice among constraints. Second, he separates constitutional economics from constitutional politics. Constitutional economics focuses on cooperative over conflictual human interaction. Politics is related to a distributional game, which involves transfers of value between coalitions of persons. Constitutional economics involves the comparison of alternative sets of rules and the analysis of the process through which agreements on rules may be obtained (the cooperative model is rescued).
Constitutional economics is influenced by two traditions: (1) classical political economy; (2) contractarian political philosophy. Under the classical political economy of Adam Smith, the existing politicized regime is described and an alternative regime is presented. As a consequence, the laws and institutions that define the economic-political order can be subject to reform. Under the contractarian political philosophy, the individual exchanges his own liberty with others who also give up liberties in exchange for the benefits offered by a regime.
Buchanan concludes that constitutional economics rests on the faith on "man's cooperative potential": "Persons are independent units of consciousness, capable of assigning values to alternatives, and capable of choosing and acting in accordance with these values. It is both physically necessary and beneficial that they live together, in many and varying associations and communities. But to do so, they must live by rules that they can also choose."
The following questions arise from reviewing the article:
(1) Why are the reciprocal exchanges of liberties central to the domain of constitutional economics?
(2) What reasons does Buchanan give for the failure of conventional economics to use their analytical devices to the derivation of institutional-constitutional structure?
(3) What does Buchanan means by stating that the analysis under constitutional economics is consistently individualistic?
(4) According to Buchanan, why an exchange and not a maximizing paradigm describes the research program of constitutional economics?
(5) Why is methodological individualism the foundational position for constitutional economics?
The article can be found here:
http://www.walkerd.people.cofc.edu/400/Sobel/2A-8.%20Buchanan%20-%20Constitutional%20Economics.pdf